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Introduction
Company-level pacts for employment and competitiveness, or in-plant alliances, are a feature of a contractual innovations in a number of western European countries (e.g. Sisson and Artiles, 2000) . They are an aspect of the decentralization of collective bargaining, conventionally associated with the forces of globalization. However, if pacts are to be described as concession bargaining they are a version with a quid pro quo from management unlike the archetypal U.S. variant of the 1980s.
German pacts for employment and competitiveness (Bündnisse für Arbeit und
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit) are distinctive in that they are an outgrowth of pronounced decline in unionism and sectoral collective bargaining coverage in that nation since the early 1990s (Addison et al. 2014 ) against a backdrop of the perceived inflexibility of sectoral bargaining. One response to this inflexibility was to take the form of opening clauses, allowing firms to deviate from the normatively binding terms of collective agreements. Pacts were however to outgrow opening clauses and have been described as "fast becoming part of a new 'normal' regulatory instrument" at a time when "collective bargaining standards are becoming guidelines that give firms considerable leeway to come to company-specific solutions" (Seifert and Massa-Wirth 2005: 238) .
Pacts are then no longer limited to companies in crisis, although it is also true that general opening clauses that can be used independently of the specific economic situation have become more common. However, if we are observing something of a paradigm shift in company level strategies regarding flexibility, there is still controversy as to whether such decentralization is in fact 'organized' or not (Haipeter and Lehndorff 2009 ).
The present paper will eschew consideration of the problems of articulation and control in the bargaining process and instead focus on six (micro) economic outcomes:
wages, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, and survivability. Further, we offer a different counterfactual to that typically used in the standard difference-indifferences treatments. Our counterfactual is made up of those establishments in which negotiations over a pact were initiated but not brought to successful fruition. Since we have no way of knowing whether those establishments that signed a pact were actually on the brink of not signing an agreement and whether those that did not do so were sufficiently close to concluding an agreement, we shall necessarily have recourse to an extended set of robustness checks that control for a variety of factors, including the introduction of alternative control groups and different estimation techniques. We also present a simulation exercise in which participation of establishments in the selected treatment and control groups is randomized.
To anticipate our results, there seems to be no evidence of pacts negatively impacting any of the selected measures of establishment performance. Rather, the results suggest the presence of positive short-and medium-run effects on firm average wages and possibly on employment and innovation too.
Econometric evidence

1
Econometric evidence on the effects of pacts is patchy. In two early studies of employment using the 2003 Works Council Survey, Hübler (2005a Hübler ( , 2005b reports that establishments that had signed pacts or planned to do so in the near future had a significantly lower probability of stable or rising employment than did plants without a pact (see also Hübler 2006) . However, instrumenting pacts by the estimated probability of either implementing or planning a pact confirmed the negative employment result for projected pacts alone. 2 Hübler also argued that there was a time pattern in employment effects. These ultimately became positive in the very long run, even if in practice the expiry of agreements served to limit such gains.
A distinctly less positive set of outcomes is reported by Bellmann et al. (20088) in an analysis using the IAB Establishment Panel (see section 4) data for the sample period 2004 to 2007. The authors draw a distinction between expected and realized employment changes as the association between the introduction of a pact and the development of expected and realized employment is likely to be interdependent.
Abstracting from type of pact (either crisis or preventative), the authors pooled crosssection time-series linear probability estimates show a clear negative association between pacts and both employment measures. Instrumenting pacts corroborated these results. Finally, the authors deploy a matching estimator and their difference-indifferences estimates fail to indicate a significant treatment effect (i.e. there is no difference in employment outcomes between establishments with pacts and their noninnovating counterparts). There is again strong evidence of negative selection:
establishments with inferior projected and actual employment change use pacts. Neither type of pact nor pact component dislodges the negative employment effects of pacts.
On this evidence, then, there is nothing to suggest that pacts stabilize let alone increase employment. However, if we are to depict this study period as constituting normal times, a subsequent/parallel study by Bellmann and Gerner (2012a) Results from a more extensive study of investments in physical capital are at best suggestive since apart from explicit commitments on locational investments the effects of pacts are most often statistically insignificant. Using data from the Establishment Panel, 2001 -2010 , Bellmann et al. (2015 provide OLS, IV, and difference-in-differences estimates of a capital growth model that point to little significant impact on investment. The exception is net investment, where the impact is negative. Even if more positive results are obtained when a distinction is made between the adoption of a pact and the contract period of a pact, the bottom line of this inquiry is that pacts do not serve as instruments of growth of the firm's capital stock but rather contribute to its consolidation and modernization. 
Modelling strategy
As mentioned earlier, pacts are mutual accords between management and workforce representatives geared to the resolution of company-specific problems related to employment and competition. This means that a pact P will come into existence (i.e.
P=1) whenever (a) some negotiation is actually carried out and (b) an effective agreement is reached. 5 In turn, a given negotiation will be successful if some variable V exceeds a certain threshold or cutoff point , where V is a function of exogenous firmlevel characteristics in the set X. Presumably X has also an impact on Y, the outcome variable. More importantly, the unobserved determinants of both Y and V are likely to be correlated, as are P and the error term in the outcome equation.
Formally, we have the following reduced-form dummy endogenous variable model:
and = + .
In this framework, the OLS estimate of b is obtained by simply running an ordinary linear regression on equation (1) 
In general, condition (4) will not be satisfied, unless there is a particular sample design, that is, a mechanism by which any selected unit has an identical chance of being on either side of the cutoff point . Then, in the neighbourhood of the cutoff point, the status P depends only on X, which makes and P uncorrelated.
In our implementation, we know for sure that if workers and management are successful in their negotiations there will be a pact. We also know that in our data there is no contamination from 'no-shows' or 'crossovers', by which we mean that the nontreated group will never contain any unit qualified for treatment since it does not make sense having a successful negotiation and not signing a pact. Nor for that matter will any non-qualified (for treatment) unit ever be treated because there is simply no pact agreement to be signed.
However, we cannot test whether those establishments with a pact were actually on the brink of not signing one, nor whether those establishments that failed to sign a pact were sufficiently close to actually reaching an agreement. We simply observe whether or not the negotiations were successful, not having access to the votes that might have been cast during the negotiation process. Accordingly, any parsimonious model that simply regresses Y on P with no other covariates will have to be based on the assumption that establishments with and without a pact do not differ in observables in an obvious manner. Under this assumption we would end up with the simple regression model = + * + or, with the addition of an establishment subscript i, hand, and on those without a pact but with ongoing negotiations on the other. The base control group and the first of the two alternative controls groups just mentioned will be used for the matching exercise. In a final step, we shall provide a simulation exercise that randomizes participation in the treatment and control groups. After all, if establishments with a pact agreement in no case were at risk of not signing an agreement (or if establishments that were unable to reach an agreement were doomed to fail anyway), then the required randomization of participation is not satisfied, the selected units are not effectively comparable, and in consequence any causal effect will not be identified. In other words, given that we are not certain that all establishments in the treatment (control) group are indeed near-winners (near-losers) -although presumably some of them are -our strategy consists in randomly selecting in each group of treated and control units only a given fraction of the initial sample. This strategy has the advantage of offering a quick validation test as to whether the simulation results are indeed centred on the point estimates. In an ad hoc manner, we fixed the fraction first at one-third and then at two-thirds for both control and treatment groups and in each case repeated the simulation 1,000 times (our Simulation I exercise).
We next allocated a random probability to each unit in the selected treatment and control groups and ran a weighted regression in which the weights were given by the inverse of the generated probability (Simulation II).
Raw data and the longitudinal panel construction
The relevant information for our empirical analysis is extracted from the IAB Establishment Panel, a nationally representative panel survey of establishments based on a stratified random sample of the population of all establishments with at least one employee covered by social insurance (see Ellguth et al. 2014 given their role in the decentralization process, is included for contextual completeness.
Information on pacts was requested of establishments in 2006, 2008, and 2009 (and in 2013 as well) . In particular, the data on pacts in the 2006 survey is very rich: it covers information on whether agreement on a company-level pact had been reached, the duration and term of that agreement, its type, and the degree to which efforts had imputation as it will be recalled that the information on pacts is not available on a continuous basis. The procedure amounts to using all the available contiguous information. That is to say, if in a given year t an establishment is in the survey but the relevant question on pacts is not asked, then we use the information available in either t-1, t-2, …, and/or in t+1, t+2,…, subject to some additional condition. (As shown below, an identical procedure will be used to impute opening clause status, OC). In particular, 7 Again, to repeat, neither imputation procedure (i.e.
described in this and the preceding paragraph) is used in our cet. par. analysis, and is deployed only for descriptive, scene setting purposes.
Our dependent variables comprise six establishment-level outcomes: the employment level (given by the number of full-time employees, or FTE), the real wage per FTE, total investment per FTE, labour productivity (measured by value added per FTE), and innovation and business survival dummies. The two latter variables flag whether any product or process innovation was carried out by the establishment and whether an establishment remained in operation by 2009, respectively.
Our set of regressors comprise detailed establishment-level characteristics. They include type of collective bargaining coverage -sectoral, firm-level, or absence of coverage -and the presence of a works council or other forms of staff representation.
We also collected information on the shares of highly skilled workers, those on fixedterm contracts, and part-timers, as well as the provision of further training. Additional arguments included the establishment's expected business volume, exports as a share of sales, the state of its technical equipment, and several ownership measures (whether the establishment is a single firm or forms part of a multi-establishment entity, whether or not it is foreign-owned, and whether or not it is individually owned). The remaining regressors are the establishment's geographic location (in either western or eastern Germany), industry affiliation, and employment size. As shown in Figure 2 , the incidence of pacts is much higher in the presence of collective agreements than in their absence. In 2013, for example, the incidence across the two groups was 7.2 and 1.2 per cent, respectively, or very roughly one half the This pattern holds over time, although it seems to be the case that as pacts have become less common, the differences across the combinations shown in the first three columns of the table have become more muted. The hallmark of the situation in which works councils are absent is transparent: a very low incidence of pacts. In 2006, for example, the maximum sample probability of pacts was just 3.1 per cent in these circumstances.
[ Table 1 Arbeitsvertrag is much more likely to be encountered, especially in the absence of a works council.
[ 
Findings
We begin our cet. par. analysis by further describing the treatment group and our . This is of course a much larger group than CG1, our preferred control group, since it does not require the included units to be involved in any negotiations -either currently or in the past. In fact, CG2 comprises several thousand units rather than several hundreds of units in the case of CG1. It will also be recalled that we further also experimented with a third control group (CG3) that contains all units without a pact but involved in ongoing negotiations.
Since this group is a subset of CG1, as it excludes all the units with past negotiations, it is likely to be too small (as will be demonstrated below).
9
[ Table 3 near here]
As can be seen from all three of the columns designated (1) in the table, the unadjusted mean difference in the case of CG1 is always positive and in 13 out of 15 cases (in the first five CG1 rows) the coefficient is statistically significant at conventional levels. The first major finding from this first run is, then, that there is no indication that pacts are detrimental to any of the selected outcomes. Indeed, to the contrary, this preliminary evidence does not exclude the likelihood of a positive effect of pacts for five out of six outcome indicators. Only in the case of business survivalsee the sixth row for CG1 -is there no discernible impact of pacts over this short sample period.
Refinements to specification (1) in the case of all outcomes other than survival are introduced in columns (2) through (4), firstly by adding the full set of selected establishment characteristics (in column (2)), next by 'de-meaning' the outcome variable and thus using the resulting growth rate as the dependent variable (column (3)), and finally by adding the base-year outcome to the set of regressors (column (4)). Note that in the case of innovation, we have in columns (3) the change in innovation status as the dependent variable, while in columns (4) the change in innovation status is also modelled as a function of the beginning-period (i.e. 2006) status. Given that the survival dummy is necessarily equal to 1 in the base year, no results are given for column (4).
Lacking results in the comparator column (4), we do not report results for column (3) either.
Again, using control group CG1, columns (2) through (4) of Table 3 show that although both the statistical significance and magnitude of the point estimate are sensitive to model specification, one constant holds: in no case is there statistical evidence to suggest that pacts are harmful to any of the selected measures of establishment performance. In 5 out of 45 cases the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant, while in the remaining cases one cannot exclude a zero impact on performance. Again, in no case there is evidence of any negative impact on performance, while some positive effects on wages persist and there are perhaps some positive effects on innovation as well.
We should caution that specifications (2) regressors to establishment size and industry affiliation, sample size in columns (2) is reduced by more than 20 per cent. A presumption in favour of more parsimonious models and larger samples is strengthened when, as is the case here, the set of additional regressors (beyond industry and establishment size dummies) tend not to be statistically significant. (Indeed, in only 2 or 3 out of 13 variables are the corresponding coefficients statistically significant, typically at the margin.) In short, given the construction of the relevant groups in the present study, results based on more parsimonious models may offer more traction than fuller models offering gains in the quality of fit. By way of illustration, in Appendix Table 1 we present results generated by an experiment in which we work with the most parsimonious model containing only industry and size controls. Clearly, in this case we obtain a higher number of positive and statistically significant coefficients, that is to say, stronger evidence in favour of positive effects on wages, productivity (3-year effect) and innovation (1-year).
Returning to Table 3 , for each outcome indicator, the second panel in each row reports the results from using CG2 rather than CG1. As mentioned above, CG2 offers an enhanced estimation sample that is roughly 20 times larger than CG1. But the results point to the self-same conclusion. That is to say, there is no evidence of a negative impact of pacts on any of the selected establishment performance indicators. Typically, whenever the coefficient is statistically significant, it tends to be higher than in the CG1 row, a result that is certainly due to the fact that treatment and control groups are in this case much further apart in terms of establishment size -consider the much reduced size of the coefficients once we control for establishment size in columns (2) through (4).
Results for a second alternative control group CG3 are predictably statistically weaker vis-à-vis CG1, as they are generated by an estimation sample that is some 25 per cent smaller. There is no evidence favouring negative effects of pacts on performance.
In this case, however, neither is the any suggestion of any positive effects. These results are not reported here but are available from the authors upon request.
Robustness Checks
We provide in this final section the results from three different robustness exercises.
The first examines whether the reported impact on the various outcomes is sensitive to joint estimation in a simultaneous equation framework, since the results in Table 3 are obtained in separate regressions. The second exercise uses propensity score matching in the selection of the treatment and control groups. The final application uses the simulation procedure described in section 4 to obtain pure randomization of establishment participation in the relevant groups. [ Table 4 near here]
In the first place, note that only in the case of specification (1) Table 3 , the estimated coefficients are similar in both magnitude and statistical significance. The sole exception is the productivity equation
(1-year effect). In the case of specifications (2) through (4), the rho statistics are not statistically different from zero in the very large majority of the cases; and whenever the pact coefficient is statistically significant the corresponding sign is unchanged and its magnitude largely unchanged. In sum, we would conclude that the results reported earlier in Table 3 do not seem to be sensitive to whether the five outcome equations are separately or jointly estimated.
The results based on propensity score matching are given in Table 5 . The comparator is again Table 3 , columns (2) through (4). But on this occasion two control groups are considered, CG1 and CG2, the latter to underline the point that good matching is indeed difficult to achieve. In the absence of observables, specification (1) is missing from this exercise.
[ Table 5 near here]
The matching procedure implies a strong reduction in the actual number of establishments that are actually being compared. In the top left cell of the table, for example, we are left with only some 40 percent of the units reported in Table 3 , and in most cases the reduction in units is more than this. Using observables to obtain comparable groups within the framework of the relevant treatment and control groups constructed here clearly has some deleterious effects on the number of statistically significant coefficients obtained after matching. Nevertheless, for CG1 in no case do we obtain any statistically significant negative impact of pacts on the selected performance
indicators.
An interesting aspect of this exercise is revealed by matching the selected treatment group and CG2. As can be seen in the table, in more than 50 per cent of the cases the mean difference in observables between the two groups has not been sufficiently reduced after the matching (see the p-values of the chi2 statistic). This result suggests that CG2 is not a satisfactory comparator. In contrast, when using CG1 the null of the corresponding test is rejected in only 7 cases out of 45 and never at the 0.01 level.
Finally, we illustrate our simulation exercise. The goal here is to check whether the simulation generates mean values that are centred on the point estimates reported in Table 3 . To this end we produce 1,000 runs in Simulations I and II. It will be recalled that in Simulation I we fix the fraction of selected participants from the treatment and controls at 1/3 and 2/3, respectively, while in Simulation II we randomly allocate a sample probability to each unit in those groups and then run a weighted regression.
[ Figure 4 near here]
In the interests of economy, the single case selected is the 2-year effect on wages in columns (3) and (4) Finally, given the results generated by Simulation II, in which participation is fully random, there seems to be no reason to suspect that the pattern of histograms would be radically different had we changed the 1/3 and 2/3 shares in Simulation I to virtually any other configuration (i.e. share in the (0, 1) interval).
Conclusions
Pacts for employment and competitiveness are one aspect of an unprecedented decentralization of collective bargaining from sectoral to shop floor level. This decentralization, together with the growth of individual bargaining between firms and their workers, is widely held to be the key to the resurgence of the German economy.
Thus, Dustmann et al. (2014) have speculated that wage restraint and decreasing real wages, and consequently falling unemployment, can be allied not only to a sharp decline in the share of workers covered by collective agreements but also to the increase in opening clauses. Our focus has been upon decentralization of collective bargaining rather than deunionization, and on pacts rather than opening clauses. The latter have been addressed in a descriptive fashion only, most obviously because our test procedure has a basis in a comparison of negotiations that (can be assumed to have) narrowly failed or succeeded. Moreover, the local agreements that we do investigate are more likely to be the result of an integrative bargaining exercise or win-win situation for both sides. A number of outcome indicators in the baseline model supported this presumption, of which three in particular -higher wages, enhanced productivity, and improved innovation -are quite robust to our sensitivity tests. Given the likely diversity in firm behaviour and the short time period examined, we consider these to be rather strong results. For the future, the workplace outcomes of decentralized bargaining of all types need be more closely monitored than hitherto, as well as the consequences of the shift in the architecture of collective bargaining for macro performance (see Visser 2013; Addison 2015).
Notes
1. Here we do not consider the descriptive literature on pacts other than to note in passing two German-language studies by Rehder (2003) and Berthold et al. (2003) that offer a typology of pacts and address what is similar to concession bargaining in the German experience and what is distinctive, and also the large sample study by Seifert and Massa-Wirth (2005) of the evolution of pacts and the link between pact content and the economic situation of the firm.
2. Hübler also examines the impact of different pact components, reporting favourable effects for some (e.g. working time extensions) but not others (e.g. work reorganization).
3. Note the qualification that during the Great Recession employment barely fell and unemployment hardly rose (see Burda and Hunt 2011) .
4. For an ambitious simultaneous analysis of pacts, employment change, and real capital growth suggesting that pacts may be bluff packages, see Bellmann et al. (2014) .
5. According to Zagelmeyer (2010) , negotiations usually take 3 to 6 months.
6. In this scenario, observe that identification of b relies ultimately on the continuity of ( | = ) at = , given that under continuity we have
7. The above discussion is necessarily a summary description; the code for the entire procedure is available from the authors upon request. We note that in 2005, 2007, and 2011 establishments were also asked whether they were currently making use of any existing opening clause. In this case, however, it would clearly be unreasonable to condition use of an opening clause status in year t on collective bargaining in year t-1 or t+1.
8. This time series is closely mimicked by the corresponding time series on the presence of pacts in establishments with some type of worker workplace representation (i.e. both works councils proper and other staff representative bodies). The annual values for works councils exceed those for staff representation by less than 2 percentage points.
9. Construction of other alternative control groups is possible, but we refrain from reporting results based on such further experimentation as the set of tables would expand rapidly given the extended nature of our experiments that include different combinations of outcomes as well as short-and medium-run scenarios. 
Notes:
The vertical bar gives the point estimate reported in Table 4 , columns (3) and (4), first row, 2-year effects. The simulation exercises are described in section 3. For descriptions of the specifications, see the notes to Notes: The total number of establishments with non-missing information in , 2008 , 2009 , and 2013 (3) and (4) Notes: See notes to Table 3 . The results are based on radius matching with the distance d set at d=0.001, implemented using psmatch2 in Stata 14. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses and the number of observations is given by the number of (on-support) units in the treatment and control groups. The chi2 statistic tests the joint significance of all included variables in the probit regression after matching. The null is no joint significance and the reported statistic is the corresponding p-value. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
APPENDIX Notes: See notes to Table 3 . For the 1-year effect, in column (1), the reported coefficients are obtained from model (5), while the model in column (2) adds establishment size and industry dichotomous variables (6 and 19 dummies, respectively) to the right-hand-side of the equation. In columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is given by ( ,2007 − ,2006 ). Finally, in column (4), the set of right-hand-side variables include the ,2006 term. CG1 is the selected control group. The specifications for the 2-and 3-year effects are similar, with ,2007 being replaced by ,2008 and ,2009 , respectively. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
